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Europe is stepping in to cover the void created by the reduction in U.S. Military backing for Ukraine

The nations of northern and western Europe now represent 95% of backing for Kyiv

A Ukrainian soldier fires a howitzer in the Kharkiv region.Vyacheslav Madiyevskyy (REUTERS)

Exactly one year ago, U.S. President Donald Trump proudly declared he was instantly launching peace talks in Ukraine. It was February 12, and he had just called his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, and Ukrainian leader Volodymyr Zelenskiy to kick off a trilateral conversation. The front lines, nearing their fourth year, were still locked in deadlock across eastern Ukraine. The United States, which Trump inherited from Joe Biden, had been the top and primary supporter among allies in supplying Ukraine’s military and financial defense. Twelve months on, the battlefield sees almost no change—and there remains minimal advancement in negotiations over a cessation of hostilities—but a major transformation has occurred in Washington’s halls of power: the U.S. Has nearly halted all assistance to Kyiv, and Europe has stepped in.

The Kiel Institute for The World Economy, established in Germany over a century ago, has tracked aid flows since Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022. In its most recent evaluation, published Wednesday, the think tank reports that “Europe has almost offset the collapse in U.S. Support.” Specifically, U.S. Contributions dropped by nearly 99% last year; aid from European partners rose by 59% in financial and humanitarian support, and by 67% in military assistance. “As a result, total aid in 2025 remained close to previous years,” the institute observes.

With the figures in hand, it’s evident that Trump has reached his objective. The Republican leader stressed in the early months of his presidency that defending Ukraine was Europe’s duty. He even called on Zelenskiy to repay the funds the United States had expended during the first three years of the Russian occupation, a demand he tempered with the signing of the minerals trade agreement.

By April 2024, the U.S. Congress had approved five aid bills totaling around $180 billion. Yet, according to Kiel Institute data, Washington allocated just $475 million last year for a military package and nothing for humanitarian or financial assistance.

Europe, driven by The European Union—89% of the EU’s financial and humanitarian aid flows from Brussels through loans, grants, or revenue from frozen Russian assets—has assumed a leading role in supporting Kyiv. Yet, the military assistance delivered falls well short of what allies—including the United States—provided in 2023, a peak year for aid, and is already 4% below the level given during the first year of Russia’s offensive.

The distribution, however, remains uneven. The Kiel Institute notes that Scandinavian and Western European nations, led by Germany and the United Kingdom, make up nearly 95% of military assistance, far surpassing the southern region where Spain sits—where the Spanish government committed €817 million ($970 million) last November, 75% of which went to military hardware—and Ukraine’s eastern neighbors.

The credit, however, belongs to Northern Europe. The German analysis center gathers data from 31 allied nations. Among them, the northern countries—such as the Scandinavian and Baltic states—account for just 8% of the combined GDP, yet provide 33% of the total arms expenditure to oppose the Russian aggressor. In proportion to their economic size, the commitments of Norway, Denmark, and Sweden—all three contributing more than 0.6% of their GDP—are substantially higher than Germany’s, which leads Europe in absolute spending. Spain barely cracks the top 20.

The Nordic nations have also pioneered new ways of working with Kyiv. Denmark stands out as a clear case. The process: Ukraine outlines its frontline equipment priorities; Danish specialists evaluate those requirements; and if Copenhagen gives the green light, the required funding is swiftly activated. This approach is called the Danish model. Since July 2024, Denmark has pledged €830 million ($986 million) via this financing mechanism. It has been crucial, for example, in enabling mass production of the 2S22 Bohdana howitzer, a firearm made by a firm in Kramatorsk, eastern Ukraine, and widely prized in the trenches for its agility and firepower.

Washington has also successfully transferred responsibility to Europe without its defense industry stopping arms deliveries to Kyiv. Suddenly cutting off aid to the Ukrainian military posed a significant risk: overwhelming the European supply chain, which couldn’t meet all of Ukraine’s needs—and thereby enabling Russian forces to gain ground on the eastern front. To address this, thanks to the strong ties between Trump and NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, the PURL mechanism (Ukraine Priority Requirements List) was established. This system enables Alliance members and their partners (Australia, New Zealand) to fund direct purchases of U.S. Weapons, subject to approval by the allied military command, for nearly immediate deployment in Ukraine.

Over 20 donors took part in the PURL program in 2025, donating more than €3.7 billion toward the purchase of, among other items, Patriot anti-aircraft defense batteries or Himars launchers.

A year of Trump’s involvement on the front lines and in the rear during the war in Ukraine has pushed Europe to explore fresh channels of aid for the struggling nation’s armed forces. European defense firms and government agencies have sped up their investment strategies in Ukraine’s military sector—major players like Germany’s Rheinmetall have even set up manufacturing plants within Ukraine’s borders—and forged collaborative production deals, including the one unveiled this week by Paris and Kyiv.

In response, and considering the dynamism and high output of Ukraine’s defense industry, the Zelenskiy government announced last Sunday the planned launch of a dozen manufacturing hubs across Europe, clearing the way for exporting its weapons—including the coveted land, water, and interceptor drones—that had previously been restricted by frontline wartime demands.

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